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Reports of the death of U.S. manufac-
turing have been greatly exaggerated.
Since the depth of the manufacturing
recession in 2002, the sector as a whole has
experienced robust and sustained output,
revenue, and profit growth. The year 2006
was a record year for output, revenues,
profits, profit rates, and return on invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector. And
despite all the stories about the erosion of
U.S. manufacturing primacy, the United
States remains the world’s most prolific
manufacturer—producing two and a half
times more output than those vaunted
Chinese factories in 2006.
Yet, the rhetoric on Capitol Hill and on
the presidential campaign trail about a
declining manufacturing sector is reaching a
fevered pitch. Policymakers point repeated-
ly to the loss of 3 million manufacturing
jobs as evidence of impending doom, even
though those acute losses occurred between
2000 and 2003, and job decline in manu-
facturing has leveled off to historic averages.
In the first six months of the 110th
Congress, more than a dozen antagonistic
or protectionist trade-related bills have
been introduced, which rely on the pre-
sumed precariousness of U.S. manufactur-
ing as justification for the legislation.
Justification for those bills is predicated on
the belief that manufacturing is in decline
and that the failure of U.S. trade policy to
address unfair competition is to blame. But
those premises are wrong. The totality of
evidence points to a robust manufacturing
sector that has thrived on account of
greater international trade.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
A certain fallacy has taken hold in Wash-
ington. Too many lawmakers are operating
under a mistaken trio of assumptions: that U.S.
manufacturing is on the decline, that unfair for-
eign competition explains that decline, and that
failure to formulate a policy response to arrest
and reverse that trend imperils the nation’s
future.The ascent of those views on Capitol Hill
is a testament to the power of exaggeration, rep-
etition, and indignation, and is a profound dis-
service to the truth. Some very bad policy
options, predicated on those myths, are now
under consideration in Congress.
Reports of the death of U.S. manufacturing
have been greatly exaggerated. It is true that
the number of workers employed in U.S. man-
ufacturing industries declined by about three
million between 2000 and 2003. It is also true
that real wage growth in manufacturing has
been anemic since the manufacturing recession
earlier in the decade. And it is correct that the
manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP
has been shrinking. But those data are not evi-
dence of a declining manufacturing sector or
unfair trade competition. At most, they shed
some light on a sector that is in transition. And
during that transition, some phenomenal oper-
ating results have been registered.
Since the nadir of the manufacturing reces-
sion in 2002, the sector as a whole has experi-
enced robust and sustained output, revenue,
and profit growth, achieving gains in all three
for four straight years. Two thousand and six
was a record year for output, revenues, profits,
profit rates, and return on investment in the
manufacturing sector. And, despite all the sto-
ries about the erosion of U.S. manufacturing
primacy, the United States remains the world’s
most prolific manufacturer—producing two
and a half times more output in 2006 than
those much-celebrated Chinese factories.
Of course, manufacturing is not monolithic.
It comprises a variety of industries, each facing
different economic circumstances. Some indus-
tries may be doing very well, while others strug-
gle to adapt to changing circumstances. Accord-
ing to the findings presented in this paper, for
every two U.S. manufacturing industries that
experienced increases in revenue, one experi-
enced a decline; for every two that saw their prof-
its increase, one saw its profits decline; for every
two that experienced increases in output, one
experienced falling output. Thus, roughly two-
thirds of U.S. manufacturing is doing well by the
most traditional metrics of economic health.
What about the other third? Can their lagging
health be attributed to increased foreign compe-
tition? If so, are policymakers justified in inter-
vening to try to change the tide? 
This paper seeks to present the facts about
the condition of U.S. manufacturing, while dis-
pensing with some persistent myths along the
way.
Proliferating Myths
Washington is abuzz with talk of U.S. man-
ufacturing demise. Protectionists on the op-ed
pages, on the airwaves, and in Congress
emphasize the decline of U.S. manufacturing at
the hands of insidious foreign competition,
which has been enabled (if not encouraged) by
an administration that has ignored the plight
of blue-collar America, while tolerating unfair
foreign trade practices. Reinforcing that per-
spective are the opinions expressed almost
nightly by television talk show hosts, who seem
more intent on stoking controversy than on
providing a forum for honest debate.
The thrust of those messages, which con-
tinue even after several consecutive years of
recovery and strong operating performance
within the manufacturing sector, is that new
trade policies are needed to arrest the decline of
U.S. manufacturing, which would otherwise be
in excellent financial health, and a reliable
engine of U.S. job growth. Averting new, play-
ing-field-leveling trade policies in the near
term, so the message goes, will further erode
U.S. capacity to maintain its position of global
economic preeminence.
Several years into this campaign, and long
after the facts on the ground have changed sig-
nificantly, that message is gaining traction with
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policymakers. One reason for the traction is
that political action tends to lag behind eco-
nomic or social circumstances. In 2007 we are
five years beyond the nadir of the U.S. manu-
facturing recession, well into recovery and even
record territory. Yet, Congress appears keen to
act on behalf of the sector, as if its troubles
weren’t several years removed. Another reason
has to do with the change in control of
Congress last November. An agenda that caters
to the wishes of labor—and its manufacturing
industry benefactors—is more likely to res-
onate with the new Democratic majority.
The political story of manufacturing is all
about job losses. Between 2000 and 2003, the
number of workers employed in the U.S. manu-
facturing sector declined from around 17.3 mil-
lion to around 14.5 million—a drop of 2.8 mil-
lion workers.1 But since then the rate of decline
has reverted to the much more modest, decades-
long manufacturing average. Between 2003 and
2006, the number of workers employed in the
sector dropped to 14.2 million—a decline of
only 300,000 workers.2 And on top of that pic-
ture of stabilizing manufacturing employment,
nearly all relevant statistics point to a thriving
manufacturing sector.
Yet the three million jobs lost figure has
become emblematic of some presumed failure
of policy. That number has been cited and
repeated so frequently that it is treated with a
certain solemnity, a false significance, which far
exceeds its utility as a measure of the condition
of U.S. manufacturing then or now. The fact
that the U.S. manufacturing sector has recov-
ered fully from its recession in 2001–02, and
has even reached new heights with respect to
several important indicia, has been nearly
totally lost in the political debate about what
must be done to save manufacturing.
In March the congressional leadership
unveiled its “New Trade Policy for America,”
which contains several policy bullet points,
including the following: “Democrats offer a
trade policy that will [among other things]
stand up for American workers, farmers, and
businesses, especially in the hard-hit U.S. manu-
facturing sector.”3 Democrats advocate better
enforcement of trade agreements to “ensure
that countries play by the rules so that trade is
a two-way street.”4
For the record, last year the “hard-hit” man-
ufacturing sector produced more output than at
any other time in history, while achieving record
sales and record profits (in constant dollar
terms). Likewise, U.S. manufacturing exports
reached record highs. Thus, trade is already a
two-way street, and policymakers should resist
any measures that might impede its flow.
Lawmakers are so keen to be seen doing
something for manufacturing that many
appear unwilling to acknowledge the sector’s
tremendous recovery. Such acknowledgement
could deprive them of an opportunity to report
back to their constituents how hard they are
working for the American family.
Testifying recently at a House Ways and
Means Committee trade subcommittee hearing
on the merits of the Nonmarket Economy Trade
Remedy Act of 2007 (a bill to, among other
things, authorize the application of countervail-
ing duties against nonmarket economies), Rep.
Peter Visclosky (D-IN) offered, “My message,
simply put, is that if we are to maintain a manu-
facturing base in the United States, we must have
zero tolerance for unfair and illegal trade. . . . If
our companies cannot count on a level playing
field, then U.S. manufacturing has no long-term
future.”5 Visclosky should also consider the
growing importance of export markets to U.S.
manufacturers lest he think there is nothing to
lose by enacting aggressive trade legislation.
In May, Democratic members of the Michi-
gan congressional delegation as well as the state’s
governor issued their “American Manufacturing
Initiative,” billed as a “comprehensive initiative
to revitalize U.S. manufacturing.”6 In offering
his support of the initiative, Sen. Carl Levin (D-
MI) opined that “the Bush Administration has
not lifted a finger to support manufacturing in
America while we have lost three million man-
ufacturing jobs on its watch.”7 Rep. John
Dingell (D-MI), another sponsor of the initia-
tive, declared: “Manufacturers are hurting in
large part due to this Administration’s lax atti-
tude toward unfair trade practices.”8
In fairness, Michigan’s political representa-
tives may have reason to despair about their
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manufacturing industries. While the rest of U.S.
manufacturing has recovered, Michigan’s manu-
facturing economy remains stagnant. Real GDP
growth between 2005 and 2006 in Michigan
ranked dead last among the 50 states. Meager
manufacturing value-added growth contributed
only 0.05 percentage points to what was a net
contraction of the state’s economy to the tune of
-0.5 percent. Nationwide, the contribution of
manufacturing was .41 percentage points to an
overall GDP growth rate of 3.4 percent. Had
Michigan’s manufacturing sector been able to
contribute as much as neighboring Indiana’s
manufacturing sector did to its overall economy,
Michigan’s economy would have actually
grown—by 0.3 percent.9
The strength of manufacturing outside of
Michigan is strong evidence that unfair trade
and the administration’s allegedly lax attitude
toward it are not to blame for Michigan’s prob-
lems. Manufacturing’s woes in that state likely
have more to do with the relatively high level
of labor force unionization, restrictive work
rules, and state laws and regulations that deter
investment and business formation there.
In the presidential debates, candidates from
both major parties have spoken about our frag-
ile manufacturing sector and the unwillingness
of the current president to respond with get-
tough trade policies. Responding to a question
by Chris Matthews about how he would be
different from President Bush, Republican
candidate Duncan Hunter offered: “You know,
we won World War II, World War I and the
Cold War with a major industrial base. We’re
losing our industrial base through bad trade
policy right now. China is cheating on trade. I
would enforce trade laws. That’s something
that the president is not doing.”10
A top priority of Democratic candidate
Dennis Kucinich would be to “cancel NAFTA,
cancel the WTO, go back to bilateral trade
conditioned on workers’ rights, [and] human
rights.”11
Even the Democratic presidential frontrun-
ner, Sen. Hillary Clinton, has been perpetuat-
ing the myth and spreading fear about the
impact of trade on manufacturing. Voicing her
opposition to the pending U.S.-South Korea
Free Trade Agreement, Senator Clinton
opined: “While I value the strong relationship
the United States enjoys with South Korea, I
believe that this agreement is inherently unfair.
It will hurt the U.S. auto industry, increase our
trade deficit, cost us good middle-class jobs
and make America less competitive.”12
And it’s not only the politicians hemming
about manufacturing and trade. Informing
policymakers’ perspectives are trade associa-
tions and lobbying groups promoting legisla-
tion that will give them an advantage over their
competition. All too often, they are aided in
these efforts by print and broadcast reporters
who like sensationalistic and economically
divisive stories. And sometimes the testimony
of pro-protection experts is no better grounded
in economics than the nightly commentaries of
CNN’s Lou Dobbs. According to recent con-
gressional testimony of by Lawrence Mishel,
an economist from the pro-union Economic
Policy Institute:
For working Americans, the effects of
the enormous growth in foreign trade
have been mostly negative, resulting in
the loss of good-paying manufactur-
ing jobs, significant downward pres-
sure on wages, and increased inequali-
ty. The doubling of trade as a share of
our economy over the last 25 years has
been accompanied by a massive trade
deficit, directly displacing several mil-
lion jobs. Most of these jobs were in
the manufacturing sector, which
included millions of union jobs that
paid better-than-average wages. In
just the five years from 2000–05, more
than three million manufacturing jobs
disappeared. We estimate that at least
one-third of that decline was caused
by the rise in the manufactured goods
trade deficit.13
To paint this gloomy picture, Mishel
ignores a host of economic facts. Since 1980
trade as a share of U.S. GDP has increased by
130 percent.14 Imports alone have increased
six-fold.15 But that huge growth in trade has
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occurred alongside the creation of 46 million
net new jobs in the United States since 1980—
1.8 million net new jobs per year.16 Meanwhile
the average U.S. unemployment rate has
decreased in each successive decade: in the
1980s, it was 7.3; in the 1990s, it was 5.8; and,
since 2000, it has been 5.1.17 As of June 2007,
the unemployment rate stood at 4.5 percent.
Given the manufacturing sector’s return to
record sales and profitability after the phase-
out of those “better-than-average” paying
union jobs, the competitive burdens imposed
on manufacturers by union rules and wages
should be obvious.
Despite U.S. manufacturing’s overall health,
in the 109th Congress more than two dozen
pieces of trade legislation—most of them
aimed at China—were introduced. In less than
the first six months of the 110th Congress,
more than one dozen pieces of trade legislation
were introduced in response to, among other
things, the presumed precariousness of U.S.
manufacturing.18
Section 1, paragraph 8 of H.R. 294, which
would prohibit the United States from negoti-
ating or entering into any new bilateral or
regional trade agreements for a period of two
years, reads: “United States trade policies have
had a devastating impact on the manufacturing
sector in the United States; an estimated
2,800,000 manufacturing jobs in the United
States have been lost since 2001.”19
Likewise, section 1, paragraph 3 of H.R.
1002, a bill to impose import duties on
Chinese goods unless and until China revalues
its currency to the satisfaction of the Congress,
is premised on the alleged impact of currency
manipulation on U.S. manufacturing. It reads:
“China’s undervalued currency and the United
States trade deficit with the People’s Republic
of China is contributing to significant United
States job losses and harming United States
business. In particular, the United States man-
ufacturing sector has lost more than 3,009,000
jobs since January 2001.”20
Those urgent calls to arms rely on two
premises: that U.S. manufacturing is in decline
and that the failure of U.S. trade policy to
address unfair competition is to blame. But
accepting those premises requires neglect of the
abundant evidence to the contrary. The totality
of evidence points to a robust manufacturing
sector. If that were understood by policymakers,
they might be less quick to endorse provocative
trade policies, particularly given that manufac-
turers are America’s chief importers, and export
markets have been manufacturing’s greatest
source of growth in recent years.
The Real State of U.S. Manufacturing
By historic standards and relative to other
countries’ manufacturing sectors, U.S. manufac-
turing is in very good condition today. Those
who speak of the demise of manufacturing often
cite a few select facts: the decline in manufactur-
ing employment, that sector’s diminishing con-
tribution to gross domestic product, and the
stagnation of real manufacturing wages. Those
are important statistics, which should be consid-
ered in context and weighed in conjunction with
other relevant data if informed conclusions are
to be reached and bad policy choices avoided.
Consider the following facts. In 2006, amid
record imports of manufactured products:
• Real U.S. manufacturing output reached
an all-time high.
• Real manufacturing revenues reached an
all-time high.
• Real manufacturing operating profits
reached an all-time high.
• After-tax profit rates for manufacturing
corporations reached an all-time high.
• Return on equity for manufacturing cor-
porations reached an all-time high.
• The value of U.S. manufacturing exports
reached an all-time high.
• U.S. factories remained the world’s most
prolific, accounting for over a fifth of
world manufacturing value added.
Given these facts, it is extraordinarily diffi-
cult to make a serious case that our manufactur-
ing sector has been hard hit or is in decline.
Should we lament the loss of high-paying union
jobs when the subsequent output and productiv-
ity statistics make clear that those jobs were
highly overpaid? With an overall unemploy-
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ment rate of 4.5 percent and average wages out-
side of manufacturing surpassing average man-
ufacturing wages for the first time ever in 2006,
it takes real creativity to paint a picture of gloom
and doom.21 And does real manufacturing wage
stagnation tell the full story of employee remu-
neration when firms cover a large part of their
employees’ dramatically increasing health care
costs? Real wage growth is held back by inclu-
sion of those inflating health care costs in the
consumer price index (i.e., the denominator).
Since employers cover a large part of those costs,
they should be considered in the numerator as
well, to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison.
That’s why total compensation, and not wages,
is the proper metric of employee remuneration.
What about output and value added increas-
es? How about record revenues and profits? Do
they count for anything? Hasn’t trade been a
large net plus for the sector? 
Output
As Figure 1 demonstrates, U.S. manufactur-
ing output reached its highest level ever in 2006.
After declining by about four percent from 2000
to 2001 and remaining stagnant in 2002, output
returned to its upward trajectory in 2003. In
2006 real output was 13 percent higher than in
2001, the year before the first full year of China’s
membership in the World Trade Organization.
It was 53 percent higher than in 1994, the oft-
cited “beginning of the end” for manufacturing
as the North American Free Trade Agreement
took effect, the Chinese government pegged its
currency at about 8 yuan to the dollar, and
Congress ratified the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, cutting trade barriers and establish-
ing the World Trade Organization. It was well
more than double the output of 1980, when
imports were only 16 percent of their 2006 level;
and it was more than five times greater than out-
put in 1960, when the U.S. trade deficit was only
2 percent of its 2006 value.
In other words, U.S. factories have continu-
ously churned out more output year after year
(with the exception of brief retractions during
economic recessions) regardless of the decline
in manufacturing employment and regardless
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Figure 1
Real U.S. Manufacturing Output, 1959–2006 (Indexed to 2002 Output)
of import levels. Thus, job attrition and rising
imports are not particularly useful measures of
the health of U.S. manufacturing, even though
they are among the most frequently cited “evi-
dence” of domestic decline.
Instead, the employment and output figures
considered together suggest that with greater
rates of labor productivity, far fewer workers are
needed on the production line. The import and
output figures considered together confirm
findings reported by Daniel Griswold, whose
research indicates a strong correlation between
manufacturing imports and manufacturing out-
put. They have risen and fallen together over a
long time horizon.22
U.S. manufacturers are among America’s
largest importers. In 2006, “industrial supplies
and material,” and “capital goods (except auto-
motive)” comprised nearly 55 percent of all
imports.23 Those are the purchases of U.S. com-
panies—not consumers.They are raw materials,
components, and other intermediate goods used
in the production of final products in the United
States. Thus, access to foreign-produced com-
ponents, materials, and sources of energy are
essential to U.S. manufacturers’ profitability.
With access to imports compromised by trade
restraints or a weaker dollar, costs of production
tend to be higher, and profits tend to be lower.
Since imports are so crucial to U.S. manu-
facturers, some would suggest that total manu-
facturing output is a figure that obscures the
true picture of the activity of U.S. factories. If a
large portion of the final product comprises
imported components, then assigning the total
value of output to U.S. production inflates the
portion of output that should be attributed to
U.S. plants and workers. Accordingly, value
added in U.S. plants is the more appropriate
measure of U.S. output. And that metric, the
skeptics suggest, reveals a manufacturing sector
in decline.
As Figure 2 reveals, manufacturing value
added is indeed declining as a percentage of the
total U.S. economy.That’s not a recent phenom-
enon, though. Manufacturing’s share of GDP
peaked in 1953, when it comprised 28.3 percent
of the economy, and has been declining almost
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continuously ever since. Today it accounts for
just over 12 percent of the economy.
Declining relative contribution of manufac-
turing to total economic output is true of all
developed countries. Just as the agricultural
sectors yielded in significance to the emerging
manufacturing sectors during the 19th century,
manufacturing has been yielding to services for
the past half century.This process is nothing to
be alarmed by, yet protectionists cite those sta-
tistics as though they were a sign of impending
doom.
Although contribution to GDP provides
information about the relative size of manufac-
turing, it reveals nothing about its health.
Declining share of GDP is not a sign of manu-
facturing weakness, but a testament to the rela-
tive size and growing importance of the U.S. ser-
vices sector, which has expanded more rapidly
than manufacturing. In absolute terms, manu-
facturing value added has been increasing near-
ly every year since the end of World War II. For
three straight years following the manufacturing
recession, value added has been increasing. The
$1.38 trillion level reached in 2006 was the
highest level since the $1.43 trillion level in
2000, which was an all-time record for manu-
facturing value added.
Still, skeptics point out that U.S. manufac-
turing output growth has been mild relative to
the growth experienced in other countries.
Perennial, double-digit percentage increases in
China’s rate of economic growth relative to the
steady but lower rates of growth in the United
States have produced squeals of panic.
According to commentator and former pres-
idential candidate Pat Buchanan, last year
“China’s economy grew by 10 percent—and by
140 percent over the last 10 years, tripling the
growth in the United States. Not only are we
shipping factories, technology, equipment and
jobs to China, we are exporting our future to
China.”24 While the growth rates differential
may be true, Buchanan’s point is as hyperbolic as
it gets. As the world’s largest manufacturer,
starting from a large base of output, the United
States would have difficulty growing at the same
pace as a rapidly expanding developing country’s
manufacturing sector, where base year outputs
are much smaller. Smaller economies experience
higher rates of growth for each incremental
increase in output, relative to larger economies,
because their bases are smaller.
A more informative benchmark for consid-
ering relative sizes and growth rates of different
countries’ manufacturing output is share of
total world output over time. According to the
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, the U.S. share of world manu-
facturing output, on a value-added basis, has
remained steady for more than a decade. In
2005, U.S. factories accounted for 21.1 percent
of the world’s manufacturing output, which
was only a very small decline from their 1993
share of 21.4 percent. Over that same period,
Japan’s share declined from 22.4 percent to
19.0 percent, and the combined share of the 27
members of the European Union declined
from 29.3 percent to 26.5 percent. Meanwhile,
China’s share of world manufacturing value
added increased from 3.5 percent in 1993 to
8.0 percent in 2005.25
Thus, on a global basis, U.S. manufacturing
continues to retain its position of primacy.
Despite the alarmist rhetoric, U.S. factories are
the most prolific in the world. Although
China’s share of world manufacturing output
more than doubled between 2000 and 2005,
U.S. producers still churn out 2.5 times the
value added coming from Chinese factories.
Operating Performance
To complement the record output just
established, U.S. manufacturing recorded its
strongest financial performance ever in 2006.
As Figure 3 indicates, after four consecutive
years of sales revenue growth—representing a
22.5 percent increase since 2002—revenues hit
a record of nearly $5 trillion in 2006.26 After
declining slightly from 2002 to 2003, operating
profits increased for three straight years and by
a total of 57 percent to reach a record $353 bil-
lion in 2006.27
Most remarkable, perhaps, in light of all of
the hand wringing about manufacturing’s dire
straits is that for the first time ever (or at least
since the data show, going back to 1947), after-
tax manufacturing profit rates broke through
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the 8 percent mark in 2006. Likewise, for the
first time ever, return on equity in the sector
exceeded an astounding 18 percent.28 Thus,
based on production and operating perfor-
mance, U.S. manufacturing appears to be firing
on all cylinders.
Employment/Productivity
Though the trend has been evident for
decades, the first few years of this decade wit-
nessed an accelerated decline in manufacturing
employment.The loss of about 3 million manu-
facturing jobs has been used as a call to arms by
those who see the manufacturing sector as under
assault by foreign competition. But employment
statistics are fairly uninformative as evidence of
the health of an industry or sector.
As manufacturing employment has de-
clined, value added per worker has increased
(see Figure 4).
Declining employment in a sector that is
producing record output is hardly credible evi-
dence of doom. In fact, the two indicators
taken together are evidence of rising labor pro-
ductivity, which, as the source of long-term
increases in living standards, is something to
cheer. As Harvard Business School professor
Michael Porter put it in his influential book,
The Competitive Advantage of Nations:
A nation’s standard of living in the
long term depends on its ability to
attain a high and rising level of pro-
ductivity in the industries in which its
firms compete.29
When manufacturers can produce more
output with fewer and less costly inputs, that’s
called progress. With the national unemploy-
ment rate at 4.5 percent, 1.8 million net new
jobs created each year, U.S. plants producing
record output, and manufacturing companies
earning record profits, what is so troubling
about the loss of manufacturing jobs? 
Compensation
The notion that most of the jobs lost were
high-paying union manufacturing jobs and the
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new jobs obtained were all lower-paying ser-
vice sector positions is also a myth. Not only
are there many more jobs in the services sector
than in manufacturing, but, contrary to popu-
lar misconception, the average wage paid in the
services sector is higher than the average wage
in the manufacturing sector.
According to a 2003 Commerce Depart-
ment study, “Manufacturing in America,” which
provided a comprehensive assessment of the
state of U.S. manufacturing as it began its recov-
ery from recession:
Manufacturing’s advantage in total
compensation is based on benefits,
rather than higher hourly wages.
Average hourly earnings of production
workers since 1967, when measured on
an inflation-adjusted basis, suggest that
manufacturing as a sector has offered
an average, rather than high, hourly
wage. There are, of course, specific sec-
tors such as autos and steel that have
offered wages far above the average, but
these are balanced by others that have
offered below average wages. In fact,
the average hourly earnings in the
wholesale trade, finance, and services
sectors have surpassed those in manu-
facturing over the past 10 years; only
retail trade remains lower.30
Real wage growth in manufacturing has
been somewhat stagnant over the course of this
decade. That would seem to suggest that the
benefits of any productivity gains are not going
to the workers. But wages are only a part of
total compensation, which includes retirement,
health care, other insurance, vacation pay, and
other expenses. The costs of health insurance,
in particular, have been increasing much faster
than the consumer price index as a whole.
Thus, the value of benefits employees receive
has been increasing.The Commerce study pro-
vides some illuminating data on the topic:
The advantage of working in the man-
ufacturing sector has derived, instead,
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Figure 4
Manufacturing Employment and Value Added per Worker 1998–2006 
(Data Indexed to 1998 Values)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
from the higher level of average bene-
fits received ($8.89 per hour for manu-
facturing versus $5.94 for non-manu-
facturing).Manufacturers contribute an
average of $0.81 per hour more for
health insurance, $0.66 more for over-
time and supplemental pay, $0.62 more
for leave, $0.29 more for retirement,
and $0.34 more for other benefits.31
Benefits continue to be a large part of man-
ufacturing compensation, and total compensa-
tion has been rising since the recession. For
manufacturing workers, real wages increased
by a total of 4 percent between 2001 and 2005,
while real benefits increased by 42 percent.32
Compensation for manufacturing workers was
up 11 percent, as opposed to 6 percent for the
economy as a whole.
Trade 
As described above, the rising level of U.S.
imports and exports has been associated with
positive developments in key manufacturing
performance indicia. As Figure 5 illustrates,
changes in output, exports, and revenues close-
ly track changes in imports, whereas Figure 6
demonstrates the relative unresponsiveness of
compensation and employment to changing
levels of imports. As manufactured imports
declined in 2001 and 2002, manufacturing
output, exports, and revenues declined as well.
When imports began to pick up again as the
manufacturing recession was ending, all of
those real variables tracked upwards, adding yet
more data points to the line that confirms a
strong positive correlation. Contrary to the
assertions of trade bashers, changes in compen-
sation and employment appear to have been
unaffected by changes in imports.
The premise that U.S. manufacturing is
under duress from imports is not supported by
the data, which instead indicates record manu-
facturing performance by the most relevant
measures. As manufacturing imports have
achieved new heights, manufacturing output,
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Figure 5
Real Imports, Real Output, Real Exports, and Real Revenues, 2000–2006 (Values Indexed
to 2002)
revenues, exports, and profits have all set
records, too. Trade is an important part of that
success story: greater access to raw materials
and components has helped control costs of
production, while greater access to foreign
markets has been crucial to surging sales rev-
enues.
Adopting bellicose rhetoric toward trade
partners and agitating for restrictive policies
would be shortsighted even if there were wide-
ranging problems within the manufacturing
sector. U.S. manufacturers account for more
than half of all U.S. import value. Just injecting
uncertainty into the trade and investment cli-
mate, not to mention imposing restrictions,
would likely lead to higher costs. Insisting on
Chinese currency revaluation and risking retal-
iation by supporting provocative measures to
compel that outcome, when the consequences
of a rising Yuan could include higher raw
materials’ costs for U.S. producers is simply
playing with fire. The same presumed dynam-
ic that would deter U.S. consumers from pur-
chasing Chinese goods would affect U.S. pro-
ducers by driving up their costs; and stronger
Chinese demand for commodities and other
materials, on account of a stronger currency,
would also put upward pressure on the prices of
oil, rubber, copper, iron ore, and other com-
modities needed by U.S. producers and paid for
by U.S. consumers.
The data presented above indicate that the
U.S. manufacturing sector is doing quite well,
as a whole. But averages can obscure acute cir-
cumstances. To be sure, U.S. manufacturing is
not monolithic. It comprises a variety of indus-
tries, each facing different conditions of com-
petition for inputs and customers, each requir-
ing different mixes of labor and capital, and
each facing differing degrees and manifesta-
tions of competition from foreign producers.
Skill sets of workers, exposure to international
competition, volatility of the market, ability to
attract capital, and other factors can differ dra-
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Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (imports); Bureau of Economic Analysis (employment and compensation).
matically across industries. Some industries
may be doing exceptionally well by historic
standards and relative to their foreign competi-
tion, while others might be struggling by either
standard or both. Some industries might be
enjoying the fruits of international trade—bet-
ter and more cost-effective access to raw mate-
rials and production components as well as
access to bigger markets for their final prod-
ucts—while others have simply struggled to
eke out profits as international trade has grown
over the decades.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to
assessing the state of U.S. manufacturing and
the impact of trade on an industry-specific
basis by presenting and evaluating objective,
commonly used government data on operating
performance, output, employment, compensa-
tion, and trade. As described in greater detail
below, most industries within the manufactur-
ing sector are doing well by those measures.
The few that are not performing well—that
have experienced declining revenues, profits,
and output—are those less technologically
intensive industries characterized by a lower-
skilled workforce and lower wages.
In effect, the picture that emerges from these
data about U.S. manufacturing and trade is a
textbook explanation of comparative advantage.
U.S. manufacturing, although declining in terms
of its total contribution to U.S. output, is thriv-
ing at the higher end of the value chain, while it
is atrophying at the lower end.
The Industry-Specific
Details
The government agencies that collect data
and publish reports on U.S. economic activity
often present their findings by industry so that
the state of the apparel industry, for example, can
be distinguished from the state of the computer
and electronics products industry.The most com-
mon classification system is the North American
Industrial Classification System, which provides
for 21 distinct manufacturing industries.33
Presented below are the 21 broad (3-digit)
manufacturing industries within the NAICS.
• 311, Food Manufacturing
• 312, Beverage and Tobacco Product Man-
ufacturing
• 313, Textile Mills
• 314, Textile Product Mills
• 315, Apparel Manufacturing
• 316, Leather and Allied Product Man-
ufacturing
• 321, Wood Product Manufacturing
• 322, Paper Manufacturing
• 323, Printing and Related Support Activ-
ities
• 324, Petroleum and Coal Products Man-
ufacturing
• 325, Chemical Manufacturing
• 326, Plastics and Rubber Products Man-
ufacturing
• 327, Nonmetallic Mineral Product Man-
ufacturing
• 331, Primary Metal Manufacturing
• 332, Fabricated Metal Product Man-
ufacturing
• 333, Machinery Manufacturing
• 334, Computer and Electronic Product
Manufacturing
• 335, Electrical Equipment, Appliance,
and Component Manufacturing
• 336, Transportation Equipment Man-
ufacturing
• 337, Furniture and Related Product
Manufacturing
• 339, Miscellaneous Manufacturing
For each of the 21 industries, data pertain-
ing to production, financial performance,
employment, productivity, compensation, and
trade were collected and assessed. The data for
each of those statistics are presented as appen-
dices, and are referenced throughout the dis-
cussion below.
Table 1 provides a consolidated picture of the
changes in those data, from which many useful
conclusions can be drawn.34 For each industry,
the table includes a percentage change from
2002 (the nadir of the manufacturing recession)
through the most recent full year for which data
were available (either 2006 or 2005). It also
includes a “rank” for each metric, where “1” cor-
responds to the best change in performance and
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“18” corresponds to the worst.The industries are
presented in descending order of “average rank,”
which is the rank calculated by averaging the
ranks of the performance metrics—revenues,
profits, output, value added, and exports.
What immediately stands out from these
data is the fact that the strong performance of
U.S. manufacturing as a whole, described above,
has been widely distributed among its compo-
nent industries. In other words, the average
strength of the sector has not been driven by the
strong performance of just a few industries.
From the perspective of real manufacturing
revenues, 2002 was the nadir of the overall
manufacturing recession. Real revenues for the
sector had fallen nearly 10 percent from record
levels in 2000. By 2006, real revenues had
jumped nearly 23 percent for manufacturing as
a whole, eclipsing previous sales records
achieved throughout the 1990s, to establish a
new record high of nearly $5 trillion.
Contrary to assertions of the demise of
manufacturing, 13 of 18 industries showed rev-
enue gains between 2002 and 2006. Twelve of
those 13 industries experienced double-digit
percentage increases. Significantly, those gains
do not reflect a one-time surge attributable to
something aberrational. Out of the 13 indus-
tries experiencing revenue gains between 2002
and 2006, 12 experienced gains year-over-year,
every year or every year but one, which suggests
that revenue growth is an ongoing trend.35
The profit picture was similar. The nearly
50 percent increase in real operating profits
between 2002 and 2006 was also widely dis-
tributed. Real profits also increased for 13 of 18
industries, and 11 of those 13 experienced dou-
ble-digit percentage increases. Nine of those 13
had year-over-year profit increases in every
year or every year but one. But, unlike rev-
enues, which bottomed out in 2002, manufac-
turing operating profits hit their low in 2001,
plunging 47 percent from record highs the pre-
vious year. From 2001 to 2006, operating prof-
its for the sector as a whole increased by a
whopping 94 percent.
As far as production goes, real manufactur-
ing output, which hit a record in 2006,
increased for 13 of 18 component industries,
and real value-added increased for 12 of 18. All
of the industries experiencing increased output
had year-over-year output increases every year
or every year but one.
As has been frequently noted, employment
in the manufacturing sector has been declining
for decades. After a pronounced 16 percent drop
between 2000 and 2003, attrition rates returned
to the longer-term, gradual rate of decline in
2004. All of the 3-digit manufacturing indus-
tries experienced job losses between 1998 and
2005 and between 2002 and 2005. But declin-
ing employment amid rising output reflects
increasing productivity. Annual value added per
worker increased from around $81,000 in 1998
to around $96,000 in 2005, an increase of 18
percent. Since the bottom of the recession in
2002, value added per worker has increased
nearly 11 percent. All but two industries experi-
enced increases in productivity over that period.
Although real wage growth has been slug-
gish throughout manufacturing, wages are only
part of total compensation. In manufacturing in
particular, the value of employee benefits tends
to be higher than the average in the overall
economy. Whereas real wage growth between
2002 and 2005 was 3.4 percent for manufactur-
ing as a whole, real benefits growth was 13.6
percent. Total compensation thus increased by
about 5.7 percent over the period.
Total compensation growth economywide
was 4.1 percent over the period, a figure that was
surpassed by 14 of 18 manufacturing industries.
Only one manufacturing industry, transporta-
tion equipment manufacturers, experienced a
decline in real compensation since 2002.
Impact of Trade
Given the findings of robust manufacturing
health, the contention that trade is a cause of
manufacturing decline is all but moot. Of
course, some industries have not been doing as
well as others. Has trade had a different impact
with respect to those industries?
What is perhaps most surprising about the
data, given the antitrade rhetoric so popular in
Washington, is that export growth was evident
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for all but one of 18 industries. Double-digit
percentage export growth between 2002 and
2006 was the case for 16 of 18 industries. Export
growth has been an important part of manufac-
turing’s strong revenue and profit growth.
It is also quite evidently not the case that
industries that have experienced the largest
increases in imports have performed the poor-
est. As Table 1 indicates, industries that experi-
enced faster growth in imports generally fared
better with respect to the crucial indicators of
health. Seven of the top 10 industries in terms
of import growth ranked in the top 10 in terms
of performance (“Average Rank”). Four of the
five industries experiencing the fastest growth
in imports were among the top five performing
industries (in terms of “Average Rank”). The
best performing industry experienced the
largest growth in imports; the second best per-
forming industry experienced the second
largest growth in imports. At the other end of
the spectrum, four of the five industries with
the slowest growth in imports were among the
five worst performing industries.
These findings sharply contradict the con-
ventional wisdom that seems to be informing
the antitrade posturing of an increasing num-
ber of policymakers. Revenues, profits, output,
value added, and even compensation rose the
most for industries most exposed to import
competition, and they rose the least for those
industries experiencing the smallest increases
in imports.
As a reality check on those findings about
trade and manufacturing performance, Table 2
presents some basic correlation statistics to
ascertain information about the relationship
between trade, employment, wages, and oper-
ating performance.36 The correlation statistic
does not speak to the question of causality, but
it does provide information about the relation-
ship between variables. The figures in Table 2
can be interpreted as the slope of the line that
plots the two variables being measured. A fig-
ure of 1.000 indicates a perfect positive linear
relationship, such that the variables move in
the same direction and by the same percentage.
A -1.000 indicates a perfect negative linear
relationship, such that the variables move in
opposite direction by the same percentage.
What the data demonstrate is that for manu-
facturing as a whole, and for most industries,
there is a stronger positive correlation between
imports and exports, and between imports and
revenues, and between imports and profits than
there is a negative correlation between imports
and employment,or between imports and wages.
• Out of 20 industries (including manufac-
turing overall), 15 demonstrated a stronger
positive correlation between imports and
exports than a negative correlation between
imports and employment.
• Seventeen showed a stronger positive cor-
relation between imports and exports than
a negative correlation between imports and
wages.
• Sixteen showed a stronger positive corre-
lation between imports and revenues than
a negative correlation between imports
and wages.
• Thirteen industries even demonstrated a
stronger correlation between imports and
profits than between exports and profits.
Exposure to trade, as evidenced by the rela-
tionship between imports and exports and
operating performance, has been an important
component of the success of U.S. manufactur-
ing industries.
On average, U.S. manufacturing is perform-
ing very well by historic standards. But that
assessment does not characterize all U.S. man-
ufacturing industries. Strong performance is
eluding about one out of every three U.S. man-
ufacturing industries (as defined at the 3-digit
NAICS level). Within that third are a few
industries that stand out as poor performers
with respect to most of the performance-ori-
ented metrics (revenues, profits, output, value-
added) used to rank industries in Table 1. In
particular, the paper industry (NAICS 322),
apparel and leather products (315,316), print-
ing (323), electrical equipment, appliance and
component manufacturing (335), and trans-
portation equipment manufacturing (336)
have all experienced declines in three of the
four performance-oriented metrics.
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With the exception of the transportation
equipment industry (which can attribute much
of its bad performance to faulty production and
labor-relations decisions), what these indus-
tries have in common is that they are relatively
low-technology, low-wage, and labor-inten-
sive. The skills required of workers in these
industries and the going wage rates are gener-
ally below average for manufacturing. In effect,
those are the industries that U.S. manufactur-
ing is outgrowing as resources are reallocated to
enterprises higher up the manufacturing value
chain. In 1998, these industries accounted for
over 12 percent of manufacturing output; in
2005, they accounted for only 8 percent. These
are the industries in which the United States
will and should have difficulty competing with
manufacturers in lower-wage, lower-skill
countries.The object of trade policy should not
be to interfere with that process, particularly
since it encourages workers to improve their
skill sets and channels resources to where they
can be used most efficiently.
Manufacturers’ Own Words
Confirm the Data
Although in stark contract to the picture of
manufacturing decline presented by lobbyists
and politicians in Washington, the findings pre-
sented above are not merely a competing thesis.
They are the real story. And they are certainly
not breaking news to the many manufacturing
companies and industries whose tremendous
success is reflected in those numbers. Even the
most reputable and influential manufacturing
trade associations have acknowledged that suc-
cess and have distanced themselves from
alarmist rhetoric about the manufacturing crisis.
At a congressional hearing on the topic of
U.S.-China trade held earlier in 2007, Franklin
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Table 2
Correlation Coefficients
Imports Imports Imports Imports Imports Exports Exports Exports Exports
and and and and and and and and and
NAICS Exports Employment Wages Profits Revenues Employment Wages Profits Revenues
MFG 0.908 -0.583 -0.075 0.814 0.966 -0.294 -0.408 0.749 0.929
311 0.393 -0.517 -0.736 0.593 0.927 0.074 -0.642 0.481 0.456
312 -0.453 0.038 -0.598 -0.291 -0.311 0.132 0.166 0.012 0.520
313,314 0.748 -0.906 -0.690 0.367 -0.402 -0.473 -0.540 0.566 0.136
315,316 -0.230 -0.352 0.358 0.854 0.142 0.966 -0.814 -0.361 0.668
321 0.576 0.017 -0.206 0.905 0.938 0.134 -0.637 0.407 0.547
322 0.885 -0.703 -0.538 0.139 -0.559 -0.633 -0.743 0.161 -0.562
323 0.712 -0.582 -0.389 0.514 -0.375 -0.126 -0.671 0.106 -0.107
324 0.886 -0.440 -0.733 0.879 0.954 -0.445 -0.844 0.817 0.886
325 0.973 -0.703 -0.161 0.425 0.846 -0.637 -0.203 0.386 0.875
326 0.886 -0.807 0.059 0.651 0.888 -0.471 -0.265 0.676 0.942
327 0.218 -0.114 -0.277 0.822 0.911 0.619 -0.625 0.264 0.315
331 0.941 -0.457 -0.487 0.964 0.980 -0.362 -0.589 0.876 0.964
332 0.890 -0.247 -0.169 0.696 0.874 0.125 -0.418 0.662 0.800
333 0.948 -0.286 -0.706 0.871 0.861 -0.003 -0.797 0.878 0.930
334 0.556 -0.094 0.743 0.619 0.692 0.604 -0.035 -0.028 0.886
335 0.895 -0.646 -0.032 -0.240 0.139 -0.325 -0.201 -0.017 0.170
336 0.820 -0.175 0.103 -0.233 0.761 0.041 -0.306 -0.296 0.631
337 0.723 -0.860 -0.180 0.543 0.595 -0.426 -0.516 0.661 0.815
339 0.727 -0.651 0.401 0.344 0.816 -0.782 0.257 0.249 0.903
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Vargo of the National Association of Manufac-
turers gave testimony that should be required
reading for all lawmakers who are considering
supporting trade legislation on behalf of manu-
facturing.
It is not uncommon to hear that U.S.
manufacturing is on its last legs, that
we have been hollowed out and that
our production base has moved over-
seas. A look at the factory shipments
and industrial production data I have
included as the last page of my testi-
mony shows this is not true. Measured
by historical standards and recent
trends, U.S. manufacturing output is
strong. This is not, of course, the case
for all sectors. While some are doing
very well, others are not. And within
sectors some companies are doing
well, while others are struggling to stay
afloat.37
Vargo’s testimony affirms many of the find-
ings presented in the previous section. Other
parts of his testimony seriously challenge the
assertions of those who blame trade for the
manufacturing sector’s woes.
Some commentators are fond of
pointing out that the United States
lost 3 million jobs in the “NAFTA-
WTO decade.” The clear implication
is that NAFTA and trade generally are
the cause of the 3 million job loss. But
that is untrue.
It is certainly true that between
2001 and 2003 nearly three million
manufacturing jobs were lost—a huge
number, close to one in every six jobs.
The jobs have not come back since that
time, with manufacturing employment
trending down gradually since 2003.
But since the U.S. manufactured goods
deficit with NAFTA in 2001 was $38
billion and the 2006 manufactured
goods deficit with NAFTA was also
about $38 billion, how could the job
loss have been caused by NAFTA?
Since there was no increase in the man-
ufactured goods deficit with NAFTA,
it is hard to see what kind of analysis
would indicate NAFTA as the cause of
our job loss.38
Although some observers might infer
(incorrectly) from Vargo’s testimony that blam-
ing trade for those job losses would be justifi-
able had the NAFTA deficit increased in 2006,
the real thrust of that portion of his testimony
is in its refutation of Lawrence Mishel’s
January 2007 testimony (cited above) that
import growth was an important cause of the
loss of those 3 million jobs.
According to statements and publications
issued by manufacturing companies, industries,
and their trade associations, manufacturers’
chief concerns about the future of manufactur-
ing include the rising costs of health care, ener-
gy, taxation, and regulation. The past three
consecutive “Labor Day Reports,” issued annu-
ally by the NAM, have identified these issues
as primary concerns. In none of those issues
was trade identified as something requiring the
attention of policymakers.39
Conclusion
The data presented above support three
important conclusions: U.S. manufacturing is
generally in superb health, and increasing inter-
national trade has a lot to do with that condi-
tion. Accordingly, lawmakers should back away
from their hostile rhetoric about trade before
they adopt policies that will damage the sector.
Despite all of the bluster about “saving” U.S.
manufacturing, the truth is that the sector is in
robust health. Record output, record sales,
record profits, record returns on equity, and
record compensation define the most recent
year’s performance. Rather than being aberra-
tional, one-time blips, those records are all the
latest data points of a gradually ascending trend
line that has been evident since the beginning
of the sector’s recovery.
While some industries—mostly those that
are more labor intensive and require lower-
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Despite all of 
the bluster about
“saving” U.S.
manufacturing,
the truth is that 
the sector is in
robust health.
skilled workers—have not been doing well in
recent years, calls for interventionist trade poli-
cies are unjustified. Most of the five or six
industries that are struggling are industries in
which Americans have no comparative advan-
tage. Measures to promote those industries
would divert resources from the industries in
which we are more competitive, discourage
workers from acquiring new skills, and could
inspire trade policy responses from abroad that
would adversely affect our promising, compet-
itive industries.
Instead of mischaracterizing the significance
and meaning of the U.S. trade deficit and
assuming that the loss of 3 million manufactur-
ing jobs four years ago requires a tough response
today, policymakers should try to attain a better
understanding of the condition of U.S. manu-
facturing. They would learn that the sector is
doing very well. And as Figure 6 and Tables 1
and 2 confirm, exposure to international trade
has a lot to do with that performance. The evi-
dence points to a U.S. manufacturing sector that
is thriving in a global economy.
19
The evidence
points to a U.S.
manufacturing 
sector that is 
thriving in a global
economy.
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